US Coast Guard Report Reveals Toxic Workplace Culture and Lack of Regulations in Deep-Sea Submersible Industry Following Titan Disaster

A comprehensive report released by the US Coast Guard on Tuesday highlights critical flaws in the Titan submersible and its operating company, nearly two years after a fatal implosion claimed five lives during a mission to the wreckage of the Titanic.

Spanning over 300 pages, the document delves into the various stages that culminated in a preventable catastrophe, offering insights that the Coast Guard believes could prevent future disasters.

The incident occurred in 2023, resulting in the death of all five individuals on board, including Stockton Rush, CEO and founder of OceanGate, which managed the Titan. The aftermath triggered an extensive international search operation that lasted for several days before debris was located.

Industry leader William Kohnen, president and CEO of HYRDOSPACE Group Inc and a witness during last year’s hearings on the Titan submersible, told CNN that the issues outlined in the report echo longstanding concerns within the industry. These concerns are now brought to the forefront due to the incident’s prominence.

As the US Coast Guard’s investigation comes to a close, Kohnen, who had raised safety concerns with Rush in 2018, reflects on the evolving submersible industry catering to both scientific research and high-end tourism.

The report underscores the urgent need for enhanced regulations in the submersible sector. In a statement, Jason Neubauer, chair of the US Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation (MBI), stated: “The two-year investigation has identified multiple contributing factors that led to this tragedy, providing valuable lessons learned to prevent a future occurrence.”

The MBI, the highest level of inquiry by the US Coast Guard, called for stricter regulations, including the implementation of uniform standards for all submersibles operating within the US. The report cites the “lack of comprehensive and effective regulations for the oversight and operation” of such vessels designed or operated in the US.

In the case of the Titan, the MBI identified OceanGate’s “inadequate design, certification, maintenance, and inspection processes” as the primary contributing factors to the implosion, according to a Coast Guard release.

Kohnen emphasized that comprehensive regulation is long overdue within the industry, likening it to the creation of freeways, where clear rules were established when the number of vehicles increased. “By the time you have hundreds of cars,” he said, “someone came up with a very simple idea of drawing a line in the middle of the road and saying, look, everybody’s going to agree that you drive on either side of the line. That’s really what we need to do here.”

Kohnen also advocated for a third-party certification system to ensure the safety of submersibles and their crews, arguing it would help maintain high standards across international borders. He contends that future paying passengers would not fully comprehend the risks involved if such regulations are not implemented.

The report also revealed a toxic workplace culture at OceanGate, stemming from Rush’s leadership style. Rush held significant decision-making power within the company, centralizing his authority and bypassing checks and balances from the board. According to the report, Rush deliberately sidelined the board and disregarded their collective expertise to pursue his vision for Titanic expeditions despite escalating safety concerns.

When asked whether these cultural issues were unique to OceanGate or reflect an industry-wide concern, Kohnen considered it a “civic dereliction of duty.” He stressed that leaders should not create chaos, even when pursuing their goals passionately. He noted that OceanGate’s leadership, particularly Stockton Rush, was problematic in this regard.

Five years prior to the implosion, Kohnen, then chair of the Marine Technology Society, wrote a letter to Rush on behalf of around 40 other industry leaders expressing safety concerns regarding the Titan submersible. The parties discussed key issues in a call, and although some changes were made to OceanGate’s website, Kohnen felt that the public would still be unaware of the submersible’s experimental status and unverified safety.

Since the implosion, the industry has focused on establishing standardized protocols across the board, according to Kohnen. He believes that fostering relationships between different facets of the industry and maritime authorities could potentially save lives by facilitating quick consultations during critical situations.

Kohnen also mentioned that the industry’s annual conference will be hosted in an international location for the first time, aiming to attract more global attendance and encourage international cooperation in regulations.

“It’s made a bit more difficult because these vehicles travel across international boundaries,” he said. “So it’s not enough to have just a local or a national solution. It really needs everyone holding hands here and saying, look, we’re going to kind of agree that we’re looking at these things the same way.”