F-35 Crash in Alaska Traced Back to Ice in Hydraulic Lines and Airborne Conference Call with Lockheed Martin Engineers

In a recently disclosed accident report, it is revealed that an F-35 pilot from the United States Air Force had engaged in a 50-minute airborne conference call with engineers from Lockheed Martin to address a malfunction within his fighter jet. The incident occurred on January 28 at Eielson Air Force Base in Fairbanks, Alaska.

The crash was captured on video, showing the aircraft descending vertically and eventually exploding in a fireball. The pilot managed to eject safely, sustaining only minor injuries, but the $200 million F-35 jet met its demise.

An investigation by the Air Force pinned the crash on ice within the hydraulic lines of the F-35’s nose and main landing gears, which hindered their deployment. After takeoff, the pilot encountered difficulties retracting and centering the landing gear, leading to a series of events that culminated in the crash.

The pilot sought assistance from engineers at Lockheed Martin, with five participants joining the conference call, including a senior software engineer, a flight safety engineer, and three specialists in landing gear systems. The pilot even attempted two touch-and-go landings to rectify the issue, but these maneuvers failed to correct the jammed nose gear, causing both main landing gears to freeze up and prevent full extension for an actual landing.

The F-35’s sensors then registered the jet as being on the ground, transitioning its computer systems into “automated ground-operation mode.” This change rendered the aircraft uncontrollable due to operating as though it was on the ground while flying, forcing the pilot to eject.

Upon examination of the wreckage, investigators found that approximately one-third of the fluid in both the nose and right main landing gears’ hydraulic systems contained water, where there should have been none.

A similar hydraulic icing problem was discovered in another F-35 at the same base during a flight nine days after the crash, but that aircraft landed safely without incident.

The report notes that Lockheed Martin had issued guidance on the sensor issue in extreme cold weather within a maintenance newsletter dated April 2024, approximately nine months before the crash. The problem could potentially impede the pilot’s ability to maintain control of the aircraft, according to the guidance.

At the time of the crash, the temperature was -1 degree Fahrenheit, as stated in the report. If the conference call participants had referred to the April 2024 maintenance newsletter, they might have advised a planned full stop landing or a controlled ejection instead of a second touch-and-go that ultimately led to the conditions causing the crash, the report suggests.

The Air Force’s Accident Investigation Board concluded that factors such as the pilot’s decision-making during the in-flight conference call, insufficient oversight for the hazardous material program responsible for hydraulic fluid storage and distribution, and noncompliance with aircraft hydraulics servicing procedures all contributed to the crash.